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Abstract
This paper is the first to analyze market impact and execution costs
of equity trading by a pension fund. We find that, on average, these
costs are nonnegligible. Average market impact costs equal 20 basis
points for buys and 26 basis points for sells; average execution costs
equal 27 basis points and 33 basis points, respectively. Furthermore,
we show that relative trade size and market capitalization, commonly
found to play an important role, have only limited influence on the mar-
ket impact of a trade. The most important determinants of the price
effect are momentum, stock price volatility, investment style, trade
type (agency, single, or principal), and trading venue.
Keywords: market impact costs, trading costs, price effects, insti-
tutional equity trading, pension funds
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Introduction
Institutional investors today account for a large part of international stock
holdings and equity trading. For example, in 2001 they owned more than 50%
of total US equities1. Furthermore, Schwartz and Shapiro (1992) estimated
that institutional investors and their member firms accounted for about
70% of total trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in
1989. Since institutional investors occupy such a predominant position in
the equity trading process, the literature has paid much attention to the
impact of institutional trading on stock prices. For a survey, see Keim and
Madhavan (1998). The upshot of their survey is that institutional trades
cause nonnegligible price pressure.
The existence of substantial price effects has important consequences for
institutional investors, since they may cause additional trading costs (‘mar-
ket impact costs’). Trading costs occur when price effects cause execution
prices to be less favorable than the benchmark price. Usually the decision
to buy or sell a particular asset is based on expectations about the future
performance of this asset. Buying a stock with high expected returns might
result in worse performance than expected if trading costs for this particu-
lar stock are high. In such a case a stock with lower expected returns may
perform better if its trading costs are lower. Therefore, knowing the trading
costs on each stock up front might change the optimal portfolio holdings
of an institutional investor. This makes trading costs an important factor
to consider when trading decisions have to be made, since ignoring them
reduces the performance of the portfolio substantially. Moreover, for large
institutional investors huge amounts of money are involved. Even a few basis
points of savings may represent a large amount of money.
Trading costs are also of interest from the perspective of regulators such
as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Financial markets must
have proper rules to ensure efficient execution of market transactions. Reg-
ulators have coined the concept of ‘best execution’ as a way to provide
an assessment of the reasonableness of the prices of market transactions;
see Wagner and Edwards (1993) and Macey and O’Hara (1997). Although
the distinction between intentional failure and poor performance is hard to
make, poor performance can be assessed by means of statistical methods.
Moreover, the central bank, which is responsible for financial stability,
is also interested in the price effects of institutional equity trading. Institu-
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tional trades are motivated by various reasons, such as investment strategies,
risk management or regulatory rules, and may possibly affect equity prices.
Price effects, in turn, affect the wealth of consumers, firms and pension
funds, and may influence their behavior.
This paper analyzes the market impact of the equity trades of the largest
Dutch pension fund and is, as far as we know, the first paper to investi-
gate market impact and execution costs incurred by a pension fund. The
‘Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds’ (ABP) has 2.4 million clients and an
invested capital of about 156 billion Euro.2 Its assets constitute about one
third of total Dutch pension fund assets. Furthermore, ABP is not merely
the largest pension fund of the Netherlands, it is also among the five largest
pension funds in the world. A unique data set, containing detailed informa-
tion on all worldwide equity trades of ten different funds at ABP during the
first quarter of 2002, is used to identify the trade and stock-specific charac-
teristics that determine the expected price impact of trading. Moreover, in
order to gain more insight into fluctuations in the price impact, this paper
extends the existing literature by assessing the determinants of the volati-
lity of the price effects as well. Since the data provide a wide set of trade
and stock-specific characteristics including investment style, they allow for
detailed analysis of the determinants of the price impact of ABP trades.
We find that, on average, market impact and execution costs of the
pension fund’s trades are nonnegligible. Average market impact costs equal
20 basis points for buys and 26 basis points for sells; average execution
costs (defined as the sum of commission and market impact) equal 27 basis
points and 33 basis points, respectively. Furthermore, we show that relative
trade size and market capitalization − variables that are often found to be
significantly related to price effects in the existing literature − have some
influence on the expected market impact and the volatility of the market
impact costs. However, they are considerably less important than momen-
tum, stock price volatility, investment style, trade type (agency, single, or
principal), and trading venue. This is partly in line with Chan and Lakon-
ishok (1993, 1995), who find that the importance of relative trade size and
market capitalization pales beside the importance of investment style. The
important role of the trading venue in explaining market impact coincides
with the findings of Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2002), who document
wide variation in equity trading costs across countries.
2
This paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief review of the
literature on the price effects of institutional trading. Section II describes
the data set containing information on the equity trades of the pension
fund. Some sample statistics on the temporary and persistent price effects
of the ABP trades are presented in Section III. Section IV assesses the
determinants of both the expected price impact and the volatility of the
price effects. Finally, Section V summarizes and concludes.
I Price effects of institutional equity trades: a lit-
erature review
Quite a number of articles have been devoted to market the impact and
execution costs of institutional equity trades.
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) examine the price impact of institutional
trades on the basis of transaction data of 37 large institutional money man-
agement firms during a two and a half year period (1986−1988). Correcting
for market-wide stock price movements, the authors find that the average
price change weighted by the dollar size of the trade (called the principal-
weighted average) from the open to the close on the trade day equals 34
basis points (bp) for buys and −4 bp for sells.
Using the same data as Chan and Lakonishok (1993), a similar analysis
is presented in Chan and Lakonishok (1995). In the latter paper the authors
do not measure the market impact of individual trades but of trade pack-
ages. The authors define a trade package as a series of successive sells or
purchases of the same stock, which ends when the money manager stays out
of the market for at least five days. After adjustment for market-wide price
movements, the principal-weighted average price change from the open on
the first trading day of the package to the close on the last day amounts
almost 100 bp for buy packages and −35 bp for sell packages.
Keim and Madhavan (1997) investigate the total execution costs (defined
as the sum of commission and market impact costs) of institutional trades
in relation to investment styles, using data on the equity transactions of
21 institutions during the 1991−1993 period. They distinguish fundamen-
tal value managers (who focus on assessment of fundamental value, with a
long-term perspective), technical managers (who focus on short-term price
movements), and index managers (who focus on mimicking the returns of a
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certain index). The authors show that total execution costs are significant
and that value traders have lower costs than traders using strategies that
require more immediacy. Keim and Madhavan (1997) also explain execution
costs from trade difficulty. Trade difficulty is measured by variables such as
relative trade size, which has a positive impact, and market capitalization,
which has a negative effect on the execution costs. Additionally, the authors
relate the execution costs to the trading venue by showing that for institu-
tional trades in Nasdaq stocks, costs tend to be higher than for trades in
comparable exchange-listed stocks. The authors find that the magnitude of
the average total execution costs varies between 49 bp and 123 bp for buys
and between 55 bp and 143 bp for sells. On average, commission contributes
about 40% to total execution costs.
Chan and Lakonishok (1997) also analyze the effect of the trading venue
on execution costs. The authors compare the total execution costs on the
NYSE and the Nasdaq for institutional investors, using transaction data
from 33 large institutional money management firms during a two and a
half year period (1989−1991). Median total execution costs on the Nasdaq
are 99 bp versus 54 bp on the NYSE. Moreover, the authors show that −
after controlling for firm size, relative trade size, and the money management
firm’s identity − the execution costs are lower on the Nasdaq for trades in
smaller firms and lower on the NYSE for trades in larger firms.
Wagner and Edwards (1993) analyze a sample of institutional trades dur-
ing the second quarter of 1992 and investigate price effects. They establish
average market impact costs of 18 bp.
Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2002) investigate execution costs across
42 countries in the period September 1996 until December 1998. The authors
document wide variation in execution costs, even after correcting for factors
affecting costs such as market capitalization and volatility. Average execu-
tion costs vary from 30 bp in France up to 138 bp in Korea.
Several studies analyze the market impact of trades using more general
transactions data on block trades that are typically initiated by institutional
investors, and often on the so-called upstairs market. On the upstairs mar-
ket, large institutional block trades are processed through a search-brokerage
mechanism. That is, an intermediary or broker first identifies counter par-
ties to trade, after which the order is sent to the downstairs market for
final execution. By contrast, smaller trade are routed directly to the down-
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stairs market, where market makers, floor traders, and limit orders provide
liquidity on demand.
By analyzing data on upstairs block trades traded at the NYSE, the
NASDAQ, and the AMEX from July 1985 until December 1992, Keim and
Madhavan (1996) show that the average price effect of NYSE-traded stocks
belonging to the bottom half of market capitalization equals 145−451 bp for
buys and 434−1,024 bp for sells.
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) examine data on block transactions in Dow
Jones stocks executed on both the upstairs and downstairs NYSE market.
They show that the upstairs market provides significantly better execution of
transactions than the NYSE floor market, although economically speaking,
the differences are small. The authors establish average market impact costs
of 18 bp (upstairs) and 19 bp (downstairs) for buys. For sells they find
average price effects between 15 bp (upstairs) and 16 bp (downstairs).
Using transaction data on upstairs and downstairs trades on the Toronto
Stock Exchange in June 1997, Smith, Turnbull, and White (2001) show that
the adverse selection costs of trades on the upstairs market are significantly
lower than on the downstairs market. Furthermore, they show that the price
impact of trades depends on the trade type (agency or principal). The au-
thors establish an average implementation price effect of 22 bp (downstairs),
25 bp (upstairs), 27 bp (upstairs, agency), and 22 bp (upstairs, principal).
II Data and definitions
The data under consideration contain the worldwide trades of ten different
funds at ABP during the first quarter of 2002. Each fund corresponds to one
of the regions Europe, United States, Canada, and Japan. Each fund has its
own benchmark being the MSCI Europe, the S&P 500, the Toronto Stock
Exchange E300 (TSE E300), and the MSCI Japan, respectively. During the
period covered by the data set three funds were managed quantitatively
and seven fundamentally. These quantitative funds exploited monthly to
quarterly mispricings of individual stocks based on quantitative models. The
fundamental funds had a semi-annual or longer-term qualitative view on the
fair value of a company or sector and their portfolios were constructed to
reflect these views. This implies that the quantitative funds traded with
much more urgency than the fundamental funds.
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Virtually all available observations of buys and sells are related to the so-
called rebalancing activities of the pension fund. Rebalancing − adjustment
of the portfolio weights by selling and buying stock − takes place every
month and only occasionally additional trades are executed. Price changes
over time cause portfolio weights to deviate from the optimal ones, so that
rebalancing becomes necessary.
The sample consists of 3,728 trades executed during the first three months
of the year 2002 with a total transaction value of 5.7 billion Euro. Of these
trades, 1,963 are buys and 1,765 are sells. The total market value of buys
and sells is about the same: 2.9 billion Euro for buys and 2.8 billion Euro
for sells. ABP invested about 50 billion Euro (equivalent to 35% of total in-
vested capital) in equity in the first quarter of 2002. However, the portfolios
analyzed in our sample had a value of 20 billion Euro. Hence, the trades
analyzed in this paper constitute approximately 28% of this value.
Unfortunately, the database only provides the direction of the trade as
seen from the perspective of the pension fund and does not tell whether a
buy by the pension fund is also classified as a buy on the stock market. A
buy by ABP is not necessarily a buy on the stock market, since the sign
of a trade is determined by the direction of the order that removes volume
from the order book. Moreover, since the data do not provide information on
the prevailing bid and ask quotes either, we can not use the Lee and Ready
(1991) rule to assess the trade sign. However, the primary goal of this paper
is to assess the impact of a trade when the pension fund sells (or buys) a
large amount of stocks. Therefore, it is natural to condition on the direction
of the trade as seen from the perspective of the pension fund. Clearly, the
true sign of the trade could have additional explanatory power, but we are
able to do our analysis without this information.
For each transaction the data provide the execution price and a bench-
mark price in Euro. The benchmark price is the price of the stock just before
the trade was passed to the broker. Moreover, the data also tell when the
trade was submitted to the broker and when it was executed. The data also
provide the amount of commission that was paid, which is used to compute
the fee rate. Additionally, the data include detailed information on several
trade and stock-specific characteristics including the investment style of the
fund, which will be discussed below.3
The data set has been constructed on the basis of the post trade analysis,
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provided by ABP Investments. The remaining data were taken from Factset
and Reuters.
Possible determinants of the price impact
With respect to trade-specific characteristics, the data set contains informa-
tion on the country the stock was traded, trading volume, and the type of
trade (agency, single, or principal). Country dummies on a regional level have
been constructed to distinguish between Europe, United States, Canada, and
Japan. Two relative measures of trading volume are considered: relative to
total shares outstanding and relative to daily trading volume.4 With respect
to the type of trade, there are three possibilities. An agency trade is a trade
between the pension fund and a counter party, where the broker acts solely
as an intermediate party. Hence, an agency trade involves two clients of the
brokerage firm, one of them being the pension fund. A principal trade is
a transaction between the pension fund and the broker, in which case the
broker buys or sells stocks from or to the pension fund at a predetermined
price. Hence, a principal trade involves the brokerage firm and the pension
fund. Single trades apply to difficult trades that are traded separately, not
necessarily with packages of other stocks. It is up to the pension fund it-
self to decide an agency, principal, or single trade. The largest part of the
data consists of agency trades (2,178 observations). The remaining trades
are either principal (1,439 observations) or single (111 observations).
With respect to stock-specific characteristics we distinguish market cap-
italization, volatility, momentum, value and growth stocks, and sector dum-
mies. Market capitalization is computed as the dollar value of the trades
outstanding, using the amount of shares outstanding three months prior to
the trade (to avoid the look-ahead bias). Volatility is computed over the last
thirty trading days prior to the trade. The period of 30 days is chosen to
ensure that recent price fluctuations are incorporated in the measure of vol-
atility. Momentum is computed as the volume weighted average daily return
on a stock over the last five trading days prior to the trade. Roughly speak-
ing, momentum indicates whether there is a buying or a selling trend for a
particular stock. A binary variable distinguishes between value and growth
stocks on the basis of its membership of the MSCI Value and Growth Index.5
Value stocks have a relatively low book-to-price ratio, while this ratio is rel-
atively high for growth stocks. The sector dummies classify each stock into
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one of the following sectors: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, en-
ergy, financials, health, industry, information technology, materials, telecom-
munications, and utilities. These sectors correspond to the Global Industry
Classification Standard, see Table I.
The data also contain information on the trading style of each of the
funds under consideration. A dummy variable indicates whether a fund is
quantitative or fundamental, where quantitative funds correspond to positive-
feedback strategies focusing on short-term price movements and fundamen-
tal funds to negative-feedback strategies with a long-term horizon.
Sample properties of ABP trades
Table II reports sample statistics (such as means, standard deviations, me-
dians, and quantiles) of several trade characteristics such as trade duration,
various measures of (relative) trade size, and commission, for both buys
and sells. Average trade size for buys (sells) is more than 70,000 (84,000)
shares and the average value of a trade equals almost 1.5 (1.6) million Euro.
Expressed as a percentage of daily trading volume and shares outstanding,
average trade size of buys equals 4.29% and 0.02%, respectively. For sells
these percentages are 3.41% and 0.02%. Moreover, on average, it takes al-
most 4 (4.5) hours before a buy (sell) transaction has been executed.
Table III provides information on the nature of the stocks that have
been traded by the pension fund. The second part of Table IV provides a
description of the abbreviations of the variable names used in Table III.
For both buys and sells, a majority of the trades consists of value stocks
(47.1% for buys and 50.1% for sells). The main part of both buys and sells
is traded by quantitative funds. The buy transactions took place mostly in
Europe, while most sell transactions were executed in the United States. The
three largest industry sectors for buys are consumer discretionary, financials,
and information technology. For sells the three largest sectors are consumer
discretionary, industrials, and information technology (see Table I). Further-
more, a majority of both buy and sell transactions consists of agency and
single trades.6
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III Measuring the market impact of ABP trades
This section presents a further exploration of the data described in Section II
in order to assess the impact of the ABP trades on prices. We start with a
definition of market impact.
Market impact
To measure the market impact of trading, a benchmark price has to be cho-
sen. We emphasize that there are several ways to do this; see Collins and
Fabozzi (1991) and Chan and Lakonishok (1995) for a discussion. With a
same-day benchmark, the benchmark is the volume-weighted average price
calculated over all transactions in the stock on the trade day. With a pre-
execution benchmark the opening price on the same day or the closing price
on the previous day is used. Finally, with a post-execution benchmark the
closing price of the trading day or the opening price on the next day is
taken as reference price, ensuring that the temporary price impact has dis-
appeared form the benchmark. This paper opts for the pre-execution bench-
mark, which is in line with e.g. Wagner and Edwards (1993). More precisely,
we take as the benchmark the price at the moment that the order was passed
to the broker.
Moreover, we proceed as in Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995, and 1997)
and correct the price effects for market-wide price movements during the
trade. We use the MSCI World industry group indices as a proxy for these
market movements. This means that we approximate the market movement
during a trade of, for instance, ABN-AMRO stocks by the movement of the
MSCI World Banks index.
More precisely, for a buy transaction in stock i at day t we measure
market impact costs (MIC) as follows:
MICBit = log(P
exe
it /P
pt
it )− log(M
exe
it /M
pt
it ), (1)
where P exeit and P
pt
it denote the execution and pre-trade price of stock i at
day t, respectively. M exeit and M
pt
it denote the value of the MSCI industry
group index corresponding to stock i at the time of the execution of the
trade and at the pre-trade time, respectively. In a similar way, the market
impact of sells is defined as
MICSit = log(P
pt
it /P
exe
it )− log(M
pt
it /M
exe
it ). (2)
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For both buys and sells, positive market impact implies that a trade has
been executed against a worse price than at the moment of trade initiation.
Sample properties of price effects
The first and second panel of Table V report sample means, standard devi-
ations, medians and quantiles of the market impact for buys and sells with
and without commission and correction for market-wide price movements.7
Moreover, the first two panels of Table V provide average market impact
measured on an equally-weighted average basis. The third and fourth panel
of Table V report the same statistics, but computed on a principal-weighted
average basis (cf. Chan and Lakonishok (1993)). The principal-weighted av-
erages have the advantage of reflecting the market impact on a dollar-for-
dollar basis, so that smaller trades contribute less to the average market
impact than larger ones.
We focus on price effects and execution costs corrected for market-wide
price movements. A striking difference is found between the equally-weighted
average market impact for buys and sells. Buys have much more impact on
prices than sells. The average price effect of buys exclusive of commission
and corrected for market-wide price movements equals 16.5 bp, but that of
sells is only −2.7 bp. The considerably lower magnitude of the market impact
of sells is in line with the findings of Chan and Lakonishok (1993) and Keim
and Madhavan (1997) and earlier studies on individual transactions by Kraus
and Stoll (1972), Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990)). Chan and
Lakonishok (1993) and Saar (2001) argue that institutional selling is more
often based on liquidity motives than is buying and that therefore, sells
would contain less information than buys. Average execution costs (defined
as the sum of commission and market impact) equal 28.7 bp for buys and
8.8 bp for sells.
On a principal-weighted average basis the results are very different. The
average market impact of buys exclusive of commission and corrected for
market-wide price movements equals 19.6 bp and that of sells is even larger
at 25.6 bp. Average execution costs equal 27.4 bp for buys and 33.3 bp
for sells. Apparently, there are some large sells that cause high price im-
pact. On an equally-weighted average basis, these large sell orders receive
a relatively low weight. Additionally, Table V demonstrates that the mar-
ket impact distribution is much more skewed in the principal-weighted than
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in the equally-weighted average case. The substantial differences between
equally and principal-weighted averages show the impact of taking into ac-
count the importance of the trade as given by its dollar value. Therefore,
we will focus on the principal-weighted averages in the remaining part of
this section. Note that the (value-weighted average) market impact costs of
19.6 bp for buys and 25.6 bp for sells imply total market impact costs of
approximately 13 million Euro.
Table V shows that, on average, market-wide price movements are nega-
tive for buys and positive for sells. We notice that the correction for market
movements can be interpreted as a proxy for the so-called delay costs. These
costs reflect the risk of adverse price movements that can occur when trad-
ing is postponed. These costs are the counterpoint to market impact costs.
As time increases, impact should decrease. However, as time increases, so
does price variability. Waiting too long with trading can therefore increase
delay costs considerably.
The literature distinguishes temporary and persistent price effects. The
total market impact is computed as the sum of these two effects. As explained
by Kraus and Stoll (1972), temporary price movements are caused by short-
term liquidity effects (i.e. price concessions to stimulate buyers or sellers to
provide liquidity), inventory effects (temporary price effects due to inventory
imbalances), or imperfect substitution (price concessions to induce buyers
and sellers to absorb the additional shares). The permanent impact of a
trade on prices reflects the change in the perception of the market due to
the information contained in a trade. Roughly speaking, a buy transaction
tells the market that the stock may be underpriced, and a sell reveals that
a stock may be overvalued. Market participants observe the information
contained in trades and adjust their perceptions accordingly, leading to price
revisions. Technically speaking, temporary price impact is defined as the
log return from a post-trade moment to the trade (i.e. log(Ptrade/Ppost)),
whereas the persistent price impact is measured as the log return from a
pre-trade moment to a post-trade moment (log(Ppost/Ppre)). In this way,
the temporary price impact measures the price movement that is needed to
provide enough liquidity to absorb the trade and the permanent price impact
represents the price change due to the information contained in the trade.
The temporary and persistent price impact are corrected for market-wide
price movements, cf. equations (1) and (2).
11
Temporary and the persistent price effects (corrected for market-wide
price movements) are obtained by taking the moment the trade was passed
to the broker as the pre-trade moment and the closure of the market at
the day after the trade as the post-trade moment. Table VI shows that,
on a principal-weighted average basis, the temporary and persistent price
effect of buys equal 7.2 bp and 12.4 bp, respectively. For sells, these price
effects equal −15.5 bp and −11.3 bp.8 For completeness’ sake, Table VI also
reports temporary and persistent price effects on an equally-weighted basis.
Figures 1 and 2 show the average temporary, persistent, and total price
effects for buys and sells, respectively.
To provide an indication of the standard errors of our estimates of av-
erage total, temporary, and persistent price effects Tables V and Table VI
report the standard deviation of the average price effects. However, note
that these are obtained under the assumption that observations are mutu-
ally uncorrelated. Therefore, true standard errors may be different.
IV Determinants of market impact
The impact of trades on prices will generally depend on various trade and
stock-specific characteristics, including investment style. This section will
assess the determinants of the expected market impact. Moreover, to get an
idea of the market impact risk associated with the trades under considera-
tion (i.e. the probability that the price effect is large), we will also analyze
market impact volatility. Thus, we will assume that the market impact costs
of a trade in stock i at day t have the following form:
MICit = α
′Xit +
√
exp(γ′Zit)ηit. (3)
Here α′Xit represents the conditional mean, depending on trade, market, and
stock-specific factors contained in Xit and exp(γ
′Zit) denotes the conditional
variance of the market impact costs, depending on relevant characteristics
contained in Zit. Finally, (ηit)it is a sequence of jointly and serially uncor-
related disturbances, with mean zero and orthogonal to the regressors in
equation (3).
Conditional expectation of market impact
We will start with a simple regression model, taking market impact (ex-
cluding commission and corrected for market-wide price movements) as the
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dependent variable and the variables described in Section II as the regres-
sors. Table IV provides a description of the abbreviations of the variables.9
The full model, containing all variables under consideration, reads as:
MICit = α1 + α2Momentumperc+ α3Momentumperc× log(Volatility)
+α4log(Volatility) + α5log(Tradesizertso)
+α6log(Tradesizertdv) + α7log(Marketcap)
+α8Agencysingledum+ α9Growthdum
+α10Quantdum+ α11Eurdum+ α12Japdum
+α13Usadum+ α14Consdiscrdum
+α15Consumerstdum+ α16Energydum+ α17Findum
+α18Healthdum+ α19ITdum+ α20Materdum
+α21Telecomdum+ α22Utilitiesdum+ εit. (4)
We notice that, for simplicity of notation, we omit the subscripts for the
explanatory variables in equation (4). It is assumed that the disturbances
(εit)it are jointly and serially uncorrelated. Furthermore, it is also assumed
that the disturbances have mean zero and that they are orthogonal to the
regressors in equation (4). The model is estimated by means of OLS using
White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix.
In line with the existing literature, the market impact of buy and sell
transactions will be investigated separately. We start with analyzing buy
transactions. We investigate the validity of the assumptions with respect
to (εit)it by testing whether the correlation between market impact on buy
trades that took place on the same day is significant.10 For 24 out of 25
days we do not find any significant correlation. Additionally, we test the
same hypothesis for buy trades that took place during the same rebalancing
period, which leads to the same conclusion.
A specification search from general to specific on the based on the Akaike
information criterion leads to the following model for the market impact of
buy transactions:
MICBit = β1 + β2Momentumperc+ β3Momentumperc× log(Volatility)
+β4log(Tradesizertdv) + β5Agencysingledum
+β6Growthdum+ β7Quantdum+ β8Usadum
+β9Consdiscrdum+ β10Energydum
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+β11Telecomdum+ β12Utilitiesdum+ εit. (5)
Table VII displays the estimation results, including estimated coeffi-
cients, standard errors, and partial correlation coefficients. A partial corre-
lation coefficient represents the partial correlation between a regressor and
the dependent variable, corrected for the influence of the other regressors.
The partial correlation coefficient is a measure of that part of the variance
in the dependent variable that is not explained by other determinants and
can therefore be interpreted as an indication of the relative importance of a
regressor.
Intuitively, when the price of a stock has recently moved upwards, it
is more likely that buy order will have increased impact while a sell order
will have a reduced impact on prices. We would therefore expect the im-
pact of momentum on the market impact of buy transactions to be positive,
since high momentum indicates a buying trend. However, the estimation re-
sults document a more complicated relation between momentum and market
impact, including a role for volatility. The coefficient of momentum is sig-
nificantly negative, but the coefficient of the product of momentum and
volatility is significantly positive. This means that momentum affects mar-
ket impact through the volatility-dependent coefficient β2+β3log(Volatility),
with β2 significantly negative and β3 significantly positive. This means that,
ceteris paribus, the impact of momentum will only be negative when volati-
lity is low. The relation between market impact, momentum, and volatility
can be explained as follows. When momentum and volatility are both high,
this is a signal to the market that there is positive news in the air. However,
when volatility is relatively low, a buying trend may be caused by effects
that are not related to asymmetric information. Hence, in the latter situa-
tion high momentum does not have the positive impact on market impact
that it would have when volatility is high.
The coefficient corresponding to relative trade size is significantly posi-
tive. Therefore, market impact is higher the larger the trade. Since higher
trading volume reflects a higher degree of trade difficulty (see Keim and
Madhavan (1997)), the liquidity costs of larger buy trades are also higher.
As a consequence, larger buy trades have higher temporary price impact.
Moreover, according to Easley and O’Hara (1987) large buy trades convey
more information. As a consequence, the permanent price impact of a trade
depends positively on the size of the trade. Additional empirical evidence
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for the positive relation between trading volume and price effects has been
established by Spierdijk, Nijman, and Van Soest (2003) and Keim and Mad-
havan (1997).
The dummy variable for agency/single and principal trades has a sig-
nificantly positive coefficient and a value of 36.6. This means that, ceteris
paribus, the market impact is 36.6 bp higher for agency and single trades
than for principal trades. This outcome is consistent with the empirical re-
sults established by Smith, Turnbull, and White (2001). They explain the
higher market impact of agency trades by noticing that brokerage firms are
interested in maintaining their reputation capital. Therefore, the visibility
of their price impacts and the importance of the broker-client relationships
prevents them from cream-skimming their clients. This would imply that
the price impact of agency and single trades is typically higher than that
of principal trades. We notice that part of the difference in market impact
between agency/single and principal trades disappears when commission
is taken into account. When we run the same regression with market im-
pact including commission as dependent variable, the dummy variable for
agency/single and principal trades remains significant, but its coefficient
drops to 18.6. This is due to the fact that commission also depends on the
type of trade. For agency trades fee rates equal 2−8 bp, for single trades 10
bp, while principal trades carry fee rates above 10 bp.
It should also be noted that the regression analysis in this section is on
an ex post basis; that is, based on observations after the trade has been
executed. This is an important distinction to make, since, on an ex ante
basis, the phenomenon of selectivity bias will be encountered (which would
require a different estimation technique). To see this, note that it is up to the
pension fund itself to decide whether it wants to trade on an agency, single, or
principal basis. This is where the selectivity bias comes in, caused by the fact
that the pension fund’s choice for either a principal, agency, or single trade
will affect the expected market impact of the trade, which, in turn, is one of
the determinants of the initial choice for a principal, agency, or single trade.
Since the focus of this paper is on the price effects of trades that have actually
taken place (seen from the perspective of the regulator), we are interested in
the market impact on an ex post basis. As a consequence, the coefficient of
the agency/single dummy does not indicate the difference in market impact
relative to the trade having been a principal trade. The coefficient only
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reflects the difference in market impact between the realized agency/single
and principal trades. In a model that takes into account selectivity bias (see,
for instance, Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1979) and Chang and Madhavan
(1997)), the pension fund would in fact be able to estimate the effect on
the market impact of choosing an agency/single trade instead of a principal
trade and vice versa.
The value/growth dummy is significantly positive. This can be explained
by noticing that growth stocks are usually considered more risky than value
stocks. The coefficient of the dummy indicating whether the trade comes
from a quantitative or a fundamental fund is significantly negative, which
means that trades by quantitative funds have lower market impact than com-
parable trades by fundamental funds. This finding does not coincide with
those of Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) or Keim and Madhavan (1997).
The latter authors show that the market impact is higher as the demand
for immediacy in the investment style increases, which they explain from
the fact that investors with a short-term perspective are willing to pay the
price for immediacy. Therefore, we would expect higher market impact for
trades done by quantitative funds, since the latter type of fund trades with
much more urgency than fundamental funds. Yet if we correct for the trade
duration (i.e. the time that elapses between the moment the trade is passed
to the broker and the moment the trade has been executed) the apparent
anomaly disappears: in this case the dummy variable distinguishing quanti-
tative and fundamental funds is no significant anymore. The correction for
trade duration demonstrates that, for buys, longer trade duration implies
higher market impact. This is in line with Section III, where we showed that
delay costs are negative for buys. Since the trades of fundamental funds
take longer to execute on average (5.5 hours versus 3.4 hours), this explains
the negative coefficient of the dummy that distinguishes quantitative and
fundamental funds.11
The country dummy in regression equation (5) captures country-related
effects on the market impact that are unrelated to the remaining regressors.
Since the coefficient of the country dummy for the United States is signifi-
cantly negative, buy trades in the United States have lower market impact
than comparable trades in Canada, Japan, and Europe. This result is likely
to reflect the higher liquidity of the stock market in the United States. The
sector dummies in equation (5) reflect sector-specific effects on the market
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impact unrelated to the other regressors. Since the coefficients of the sector
dummies are significantly positive, buy trades in stocks belonging to the con-
sumer discretionary, energy, telecommunications, and utilities sectors have
higher market impact than buy trades in comparable stocks in other sectors.
The partial correlation coefficients suggest that the product of momen-
tum and volatility, the dummy variable distinguishing agency/single and
principal trades, and momentum contribute most to explaining the market
impact of buys.
For sells we proceed in the same way as for buys. The specification search
yields the following model for the market impact of sells:
MICSit = β1 + β2Momentumperc× log(Volatility)
+β3log(Volatility) + β4log(Tradesizertso)
+β5log(Tradesizertdv) + β6log(Marketcap)
+β7Quantdum+ β8Eurdum+ β9Japdum
+β10Consdiscrdum+ β11Consumerstdum
+β12Energydum+ β13Findum+ β14Healthdum
+β15ITdum+ β16Materdum
+β17Quantdum×Usadum+ εit. (6)
Again we assume that the disturbances (εit)it are jointly and serially
uncorrelated,12 that they have mean zero and that they are orthogonal to
the regressors in equation (6).
Table VIII displays the estimation results for sells. The results show
that momentum determines the relation between market impact and vola-
tility. The coefficient of log volatility is momentum-dependent and equals
β3Momentumperc + β4, with β3 significantly negative and β4 significantly
positive. This means that the impact of volatility will only be negative when
momentum is very high; i.e. when there is a buying trend. In such a situ-
ation high volatility is offset by high momentum. When momentum is low,
volatility has a positive impact on market impact. This can be explained by
the fact that stocks with higher volatility suffer from higher (permanent)
price effects, since trades are more informative when volatility is high (see
Chan and Lakonishok (1997) and Smith, Turnbull, and White (2001)).
Since the trade size is measured both relative to daily volume and shares
outstanding, we examine the joint instead of the individual significance of
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these coefficients. A Wald-test shows that the coefficients are not jointly
significant. Moreover, note that the marginal effect of trade size in lots is
given by γlots = γ4 + γ5, which is not significant either.
Market capitalization has a significantly negative coefficient, which im-
plies that selling large cap stocks causes less market impact than selling
small cap stocks. This is in line with the findings of, for instance, Hasbrouck
(1991a, 1991b), Keim and Madhavan (1997) and Spierdijk, Nijman, and
Van Soest (2002). However, Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) show that
the importance of firm size disappears in the presence of variables related
to investment style. Since the model in expression (5) also contains such
variables (the dummy variables Quantdum and Quantdum×Usadum), this
could explain why market capitalization does not play a very important role
in explaining expected market impact (which is reflected by its low partial
correlation coefficient).
The coefficient of the dummy indicating whether the sell comes from a
quantitative or a fundamental fund is significantly positive, hence trades by
quantitative funds cause more market impact. This is in line with Chan and
Lakonishok (1993, 1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1997).
The country dummies are significantly negative and also jointly signifi-
cant. This means that − relative to sells in Canada and the United States
− sells Europe and Japan lead to lower market impact. With respect to the
sector dummies, Table VIII shows that trades in stocks belonging to the
consumer discretionary, energy, financials, and materials sectors have signif-
icantly lower market impact. The market impact of trades in stocks in the
consumer staples, health, and IT sector is not significantly different from
similar trades in other sectors.
The product of the country dummy for the United States and the dummy
variable distinguishing quantitative and fundamental trades is significantly
negative. Hence, trades by quantitative funds in the United States have
significantly lower market impact than similar trades by quantitative funds
in Europe, Japan, and Canada.
The partial correlation coefficients show that the dummy variable dis-
tinguishing quantitative and fundamental funds, followed by the product of
momentum and volatility and the country dummy for trades in Europe play
the most important role in explaining the market impact of sells.
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Conditional variance of market impact
For the conditional variance of the market impact, we regress the (realized)
squared residuals in logarithms (i.e. log(e2it)) on the variables given in equa-
tion (4) and follow the same model selection principle as before. For buys
the specification search leads to the model
log(e2it) = γ1 + γ2log(Volatility) + γ3log(Tradesizertso)
+γ4log(Tradesizertdv) + γ5Agencysingledum
+γ6Eurdum+ γ7Usadum+ γ8ITdum+ ηit. (7)
The model is estimated by means of OLS using White (1980)’s hetero-
skedasticity consistent covariance matrix. The estimation results for buys
can be found in Table IX.
Volatility has a significantly positive impact on market impact. This
means that there is more variability in market impact in periods when price
fluctuations are higher.
The coefficients of the variables related to trade size are jointly signifi-
cant. The sum of their coefficients (i.e. γlots = γ3+ γ4) reflects the marginal
impact of the number of shares on market impact volatility and is signif-
icantly positive. Hence, there are more fluctuations in the market impact
costs of large buys than of comparable buys of smaller size.
The dummy for the type of trade (agency/single versus principal) is
significantly positive, hence the market impact of agency and single trades
shows more fluctuations than the market impact of principal trades. Again
this can be explained by the fact that principal trades benefit from the
broker’s wish to maintain his reputation. The broker will therefore try to
avoid excessive price effects of principal trades, leading to less variability in
the market impact costs of this type of trades.
The coefficients of the country dummies for Europe and the United States
are significantly negative, hence buys in these countries cause less fluctua-
tions in market impact than similar trades in Canada and Japan. The signif-
icantly positive coefficient of the sector dummy for the IT sector, indicates
that trades in stocks belonging to this sector cause more fluctuations in
market impact than comparable trades in stocks belonging to other sectors.
The partial correlation coefficients show that the country dummies for
the United States and Europe contribute most to explaining the market im-
pact volatility of buys, followed by trade size relative to shares outstanding.
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By proceeding in a similar way, the following specification for sells is
found:
log(e2it) = γ1 + γ2log(Volatility) + γ3log(Tradesizertso)
+γ4log(Tradesizertdv) + γ5log(Marketcap)
+γ6Agencysingledum+ γ7Growthdum+ γ8Quantdum
+γ9Eurdum+ γ10Japdum+ γ11Usadum+ γ12Energydum
+γ13Materdum+ γ14Telecomdum+ ηit. (8)
The estimation results for sell transactions are displayed in Table X.
Volatility has a significantly positive coefficient. This means that there is
greater market impact variability during periods when there is more fluctu-
ations in prices anyhow. The coefficients corresponding to the trade-related
variables are jointly significant. The marginal effect of trade size in lots is
given by γlots = γ3+γ4, which is positive but not significant. Market capital-
ization has a significantly negative coefficient, implying that trades in large
cap stocks have less fluctuations in market impact than trades in small cap
stocks.
The coefficient of the trade type dummy (agency, single or principal) has
a significantly positive value: agency and single trades have more fluctua-
tions in market impact than principal trades. The same result was found
for the conditional variance of buys. The type of stock dummy (value or
growth) is significantly positive, indicating that growth stocks cause more
fluctuations in market impact. This can be explained by noticing that growth
stocks are usually more volatile than value stocks. The type of fund dummy
(quantitative versus fundamental fund) is significantly negative, hence the
sells by quantitative funds cause less variability in market impact. Hence,
although, sells by quantitative funds cause higher market impact on average,
they cause less variability in market impact.
The country dummies are significantly positive and jointly significant.
Thus, sell transactions in Europe, Japan, and the United States cause more
fluctuations in market impact than sells in Canada. The coefficients of the
sector dummies for energy and telecommunications are significantly positive.
Trades in stocks in the materials sector do not have significantly different
market impact than comparable trades in other sectors.
From the partial correlation coefficients we can deduce that the dummy
variable for quantitative and fundamental funds plays the most important
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role in explaining market impact volatility of sells. Other important vari-
ables are the dummy for agency/single and principal trades and the country
dummy for Europe.
Table XI reports the most important determinants of expected market
impact and market impact volatility of both buys and sells, based on the
partial correlation coefficients.
V Conclusions
This paper has used a unique data set to investigate market impact and
execution costs of equity trading by ABP, a major pension fund in the
Netherlands. We have found that, on average, these costs are nonnegligible.
Average market impact costs equal 20 basis points for buys and 26 basis
points for sells; average execution costs (defined as the sum of commission
and market impact) equal 27 basis points and 33 basis points, respectively.
The data, containing detailed information on all worldwide equity trades
of ten different funds at ABP during the first quarter of 2002, have been used
to identify the trade and stock-specific characteristics that determine market
impact costs. For buys, the stock-specific characteristics momentum and
price volatility play a crucial role in explaining the price effects of trading.
Expected price effects are larger when momentum and volatility are high
and market impact costs exhibit more fluctuations when price volatility is
high. Moreover, the type of trade is also an important determinant of the
market impact costs. Agency and single trades have higher expected price
impact than comparable principal trades. Furthermore, agency and single
trades also have higher volatility of market impact costs. The trading venue
is another variable that considerably affects the variability of market impact
costs of buys. For sells we find partly different results. The investment style of
the fund − determining the demand for immediacy of the trade − has much
influence on both the expected market impact and the volatility of these
costs. Trades by quantitative funds that focus on growth strategies affect
prices more than trades by fundamental funds that use value strategies.
Moreover, the market impact costs of sells done by quantitative funds show
less fluctuations than comparable trades done by fundamental funds. As for
buys, the volatility of the price effect of agency and single trades is higher
than that of comparable principal trades. Additionally, the expected price
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effects of sells are larger when volatility is high and momentum is low. High
price volatility also leads to more fluctuations in the market impact costs of
sells. Moreover, the trading venue also plays an important role in explaining
expected market impact costs as well as fluctuations in these costs.
The results make clear that relative trade size and market capitalization
− variables that are often found to be significantly related to price effects
in the existing literature − do have some influence on market impact costs.
However, they are considerably less important than momentum, stock price
volatility, investment style, trade type (agency, single, or principal), and
trading venue. This is partly in line with Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995),
who find that the importance of trade size and market capitalization pales
beside the importance of investment style. The important role of the trading
venue in explaining market impact impact coincides with the findings of
Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2002), who document wide variation in
equity trading costs across countries.
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Notes
1Source: NYSE Fact Book 2001. See www.nyse.com.
2This is the invested capital of ABP d.d. March 31, 2004.
3Trades that were split up into several sub trades are considered as one single trade, if
a trader at ABP decided to split up the trade. The data contain about 0.5% of such ‘trade
packages’. Orders split up by portfolio managers will be treated as individual trades, since
it is not known whether the trader eventually split the trade in the same way the portfolio
managers did.
4Note that the data are biased with respect to trading volume, since trades larger than
25% of the average daily volume in the stock under consideration are not allowed (with
the average daily volume measured over the past twenty trading days).
5Some stocks do no belong to either of these two categories.
6Agency and single trades have been aggregated, since there are too few single trades
to treat them as a distinct class. It is natural to aggregate agency and single trades, since
these are the trades that the broker acts as an agency for.
7Since we only have closing prices of the MSCI industry group indices, we approximate
the market-wide price movements in expressions (1) as
durit
8
log
(
Mpdcit /M
close
it
)
,
where Mpdcit and M
close
it denote the previous day closing price and the closing price of the
MSCI industry group index of stock i at day t and durit represents the number of hours it
took to complete the trade in stock i at day t. Hence, we assume that there are eight hours
in a trading day. Under this assumption we can say that, given the fact that an index rose
by 100 bp on a certain day, the expected price change of that index during a one-hour
period is 12.5 bp. If, for example, it took four hours to complete a trade, we will correct
the price effect for market movements by subtracting fifty percent of the price change in
the index during the day of the trade. A further assumption we will have to make is that
overnight price movements, which are also included in the index return over the one-day
period, are negligible. For the market-wide price movements of sells in expression (2) we
use the same approximation.
8We compute the sample statistics of the temporary and persistent price effects for a
slightly smaller sample than we used to obtain the sample statistics of the market impact.
This is because, for some trades, we did not have enough data on the prices around the
time of the trade. Eventually, we have computed the average temporary and persistent
price effects on the basis of 1,935 buy trades and 1,746 sell trades. As a consequence, the
sum of both temporary and persistent price effects (i.e. the total price effect) is not exactly
equal to the previously computed market impact.
9One regional- and one sector dummy have been omitted in the regressions to avoid
perfect collinearity. Furthermore, we did not find any evidence for multicollinearity in the
remaining analysis.
10In the sequel, the significance level will be 5%, unless stated differently.
11We do not include trade duration in our regression, since we only include variables
that are known before a trade is passed to the broker. Since the trade duration is only
known after the trade has been executed, we feel that it is inappropriate to include this
variable in the information set.
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12As for buys, we investigate the validity of this assumption for sell transactions, but
we do not find any significant correlation.
24
References
Chan, L.K.C. and Lakonishok, J., 1993, Institutional Trades and Intraday
Stock Price Behavior, Journal of Financial Economics, 33, pp. 173-199.
Chan, L.K.C. and Lakonishok, J., 1995, The Behavior of Stock Prices around
Institutional Trades, Journal of Finance, 50, pp. 1147-1174.
Chan, L.K.C. and Lakonishok, J., 1997, Institutional Equity Trading Costs:
NYSE versus Nasdaq, Journal of Finance, 52, pp. 713-735.
Collins, B.M. and Fabozzi, F.J., 1991, A Methodology for Measuring Trans-
action Costs, Financial Analysts Journal, 47, pp. 27-36.
Domowitz, I., Glen, J., and Madhavan, A., 2002, Liquidity, Volatility, and
Equity Trading Costs Across Countries and Over Time, forthcoming Journal
of International Finance.
Easley, D. and O’Hara, M., 1987, Price, Size and the Information in Security
Markets, Journal of Financial Economics, 16, pp. 69-90.
Easley, D., Kiefer, N.M., O’Hara, M., and Paperman, J.B., 1996, Liquidity,
Information and Infrequently Traded Stocks, Journal of Finance, 51, pp.
1405-1437.
Wagner, W.H. and Edwards, M., 1993, Best Execution, Financial Analysts
Journal, 49, pp. 65-71.
Griffiths, M.D., Smith, B.F., Turnbull, D.A.S., and White, R.W., 2000, The
Costs and Determinants of Order Aggressiveness, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 56, pp. 65-88.
Hasbrouck, J., 1991a, Measuring the Information Content of Stock Trades,
Journal of Finance, 66, 1, pp. 179-207.
25
Hasbrouck, J., 1991b, The Summary Informativeness of Stock Trades: an
Econometric Analysis, Review of Financial Studies, 4, pp. 571-595.
Holthausen, R., Leftwich, R., and Mayers, D., 1987, The Effect of Large
Block Transactions on Security Prices: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, Journal
of Financial Economics, 19, pp. 237-268.
Holthausen, R., Leftwich, R., and Mayers, D., 1990, Large-Block Transac-
tions, the Speed of Response, and Temporary and Permanent Stock-Price
Effects, Journal of Financial Economics, 26, pp. 71-95.
Keim, D.B. and Madhavan, A., 1996, The Upstairs Market for Large Block
Transactions: Analysis and Measurement of Price Effects, Review of Finan-
cial Studies, 9, pp. 1-36.
Keim, D.B. and Madhavan, A., 1997, Transaction Costs and Investment
Style: An Inter-Exchange Analysis of Institutional Equity Trades, Journal
of Financial Economics, 46, pp. 265-292.
Keim, D.B. and Madhavan, A., 1998, The Cost of Institutional Equity
Trades, The Financial Analysts Journal, 54, pp. 50-69.
Kraus, A., Stoll, H., 1972, Price Impacts of Block Trading on the New York
Stock Exchange, Journal of Finance, 27, pp. 569-588.
Lee, L.-F., Maddala, G.S., Trost, R.P., 1980, Asymptotic Covariance Ma-
trices of Two-Stage Probit and Two-Stage Tobit Models for Simultaneous
Equation Models with Selectivity, Econometrica, 48, pp. 491-503.
Lee, C.M.C. and Ready, M.J., 1991, Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday
Data, Journal of Finance, 46, pp. 733-746.
26
Macey, J.R. and O’Hara, M., 1997, The Law and Economics of Best Execu-
tion, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6, pp. 188-223.
Madhavan, A. and Cheng, M., 1997, In Search of Liquidity: Block Trades in
the Upstairs and Downstairs Market, Review of Financial Studies, 10, pp.
175-203.
Saar, G., 2001, Price Impact Asymmetry of Block Trades: An Institutional
Trading Explanation, The Review of Financial Studies, 14, pp. 1153-1182.
Schwartz, R. and Shapiro, J., 1992, The Challenge of Institutionalization
for Equity Markets; in Anthony Saunders (ed.), Recent Developments in Fi-
nance, Business One Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, USA.
Smith, B.F., Turnbull, D.A., and White, R.W., 2001, Upstairs Market for
Principal and Agency Trades: Analysis of Adverse Information and Price
Effects, Journal of Finance, 56, pp. 1723-1746.
Spierdijk, L., Nijman, Th. E., and Van Soest, A.H.O., 2003, Temporary and
Persistent Price Effects of Trades in Infrequently Traded Stocks, Tilburg
University and CentER.
White, H., 1980, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Esti-
mator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, Econometrica, 48, pp. 817-
838.
27
sector name MSCI industry groups
Consumer Discretionary Sector Automobiles and Components, Consumer Durables and Apparel, Hotels, Restaurants and Leisure, Media, Retail
Consumer Staples Sector Food & Drug Retailing, Food, Beverage & Tobacco, Household & Personal Products
Energy Sector Energy
Financials Sector Banks, Diversified Financials, Insurance, Real Estate
Information Technology Sector Software & Services, Technology Hardware
Industrials Sector Capital Goods, Commercial Services & Supplies, Transportation
Health Sector Health Care Equipment & Services, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Materials Sectors Materials
Telecommunications Services Sector Telecommunication Services
Utilities Utilities
Table I: Sector names and constituent industry groups. Source: MSCI Global Industry Classification Standard.
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buys duration # shares commission trade size rtdv∗ trade size rtso∗∗ trade value input value∗∗∗
(unit) (hours) (bp) (%) (%) (Euro) (Euro)
mean 3.96 70,303 12.2 4.29 0.02 1,464,844 1,464,363
st.dev. 2.44 198,535 10.0 8.60 0.03 2,799,983 2,797,021
median 4.75 14,428 8.0 1.32 0.01 305,958 306,796
0.5% quantile 0.22 4 2.0 9.92e-04 4.42e-06 269 268
5% quantile 0.50 169 2.0 0.02 9.57e-05 3,852 3,839
95% quantile 6.50 305,197 29.0 14.54 0.07 6,813,513 6,834,569
99.5% quantile 6.75 1,116,399 50.0 56.22 0.16 17,188,953 17,475,886
sells
mean 4.50 84,132 11.53 3.41 0.02 1,597,814 1,605,437
st.dev. 2.40 249,622 9.84 6.42 0.04 2,916,597 2,934,101
median 5.95 17,457 8.00 1.33 4.47e-03 349,341 351,763
0.5% quantile 0.50 14 2.00 3.52e-03 2.19e-05 797 798
5% quantile 0.50 170 2.00 0.02 9.54e-05 6,025 6,011
95% quantile 6.50 306,861 29.00 12.25 0.08 7,950,280 7,982,833
99.5% quantile 6.75 1,363,861 29.00 41.60 0.30 16,646,239 16,922,149
Table II: Trade-specific characteristics of buy and sell transactions
∗ Trade size rtdv stands for trade size relative to daily volume.
∗∗ Trade size rtso refers to trade size relative to shares outstanding.
∗ ∗ ∗ Input value refers to the Euro value of the trade at the moment that the trade is passed to the broker.
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buys
Quantdum Candum Japdum Eurdum Usadum
mean (in %) 73.0 8.8 15.9 41.0 34.3
st.dev. (in %) 44.4 28.4 36.6 49.2 47.5
Findum Telecomdum Energydum ITdum Utilitiesdum
mean (in %) 13.8 3.4 4.3 11.5 5.4
st.dev. (in %) 34.5 18.2 20.4 31.9 22.5
Consdiscrdum Healthdum Consumstdum Materdum Industrydum
mean (in %) 20.8 7.9 4.7 8.9 19.2
st.dev. (in %) 40.6 27.0 21.1 28.5 39.4
sells
Quantdum Candum Japdum Eurdum Usadum
mean (in %) 66.5 3.6 27.0 27.8 41.7
st.dev. (in %) 47.2 18.6 44.4 44.8 49.3
Findum Telecom Energydum ITdum Utilitiesdum
mean (in %) 18.7 3.8 3.1 15.7 5.3
st.dev. (in %) 39.0 19.1 17.3 36.4 22.4
Consdiscrdum Healthdum Consumerstdum Materdum Industrydum
mean (in %) 20.1 6.6 7.7 7.7 11.2
st.dev. (in %) 40.1 24.8 26.7 26.6 31.5
Table III: Characteristics of buy and sell transactions: type of portfolio, type
of trade, region, and sector
The abbreviations of the variable names are explained in Table IV.
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variable description
Momentumperc momentum computed over the last five trading days (in %)
Volatility price volatility computed over the last thirty trading days
Tradesizertso trade size relative to shares outstanding (in %)
Tradesizertdv trade size relative to daily volume (in %)
Marketcap market capitalization (in Euro)
Commissionbp commission (in bp)
Agencysingledum dummy for agency or single (= 1) or principal (= 0) trade
Growthdum dummy for growth (= 1) or value (= 0) stock
Quantdum dummy for trade done by quantitative (= 1) or fundamental (= 0) fund
Eurdum dummy for trade in Europe
Japdum dummy for trade in Japan
Usadum dummy for trade in the United States
(Candum) (dummy for trade in Canada)
Consdiscrdum dummy for consumer discretionary sector
Consumerstdum dummy for consumer staples sector
Energydum dummy for energy sector
Findum dummy for financial sector
Healthdum dummy for health sector
(Industrydum) dummy for industrials sector)
ITdum dummy for IT sector
Materdum dummy for materials sector
Telecomdum dummy for media sector
Utilitiesdum dummy for energy sector
Table IV: Descriptions of the variables and their abbreviations
One region- and one sector dummy (in parentheses) have been omitted in the regressions in equations (4),(5), (6), (7), and
(8) to avoid exact collinearity.
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buys
(equally-weighted) market impact execution costs execution costs market impact
(incl. MWPM) (incl. MWPM) (excl. MWPM) (excl. MWPM)
mean 4.4 16.6 28.7 16.5
st.dev. mean 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7
st.dev. 113.5 114.2 119.3 119.5
median 0.0 19.7 26.5 7.9
quantile 0.5% −410.2 −405.2 −389.0 −391.5
quantile 5% −149.8 −143.5 −154.6 −163.0
quantile 95% 165.1 171.7 208.7 201.9
quantile 99.5% 489.1 497.1 509.0 501.6
sells
(equally-weighted)
mean 20.9 32.4 8.8 −2.7
st.dev. mean 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.7
st.dev. 148.1 146.8 153.8 154.2
median 5.9 27.5 17.4 2.2
quantile 0.5% −507.4 −499.4 −528.6 −536.6
quantile 5% −179.6 −171.9 −242.1 −251.8
quantile 95% 244.1 250.0 218.4 210.5
quantile 99.5% 605.4 607.4 559.7 557.3
buys
(principal-weighted)
mean 3.9 11.6 27.4 19.6
st.dev. mean 5.3 5.4 5.7 5.7
st.dev. 235.6 238.4 254.2 251.3
median 0.0 0.8 1.1 0.2
quantile 0.5% −1,056.5 −1,046.8 −922.8 −942.8
quantile 5% −171.7 −155.4 −123.1 −133.1
quantile 95% 174.8 207.0 265.7 241.6
quantile 99.5% 993.6 1,024.8 1,341.9 1,329.6
sells
(principal-weighted)
mean 45.5 53.3 33.3 25.6
st.dev. mean 7.7 7.7 6.9 6.9
st.dev. 325.2 323.5 290.0 291.8
median 0.1 2.1 0.4 0.0
quantile 0.5% −1,211.8 −1,148.0 −1,011.9 −1,052.8
quantile 5% −129.3 −111.2 −145.8 −158.9
quantile 95% 431.5 440.6 372.4 353.8
quantile 99.5% 1,901.9 1,914.3 1,434.0 1,420.2
Table V: Market impact and execution costs for buys and sells (in bp)
Execution costs are defined as the sum of commission and market impact
costs. Both market impact and execution costs are given with and without
correction for market-wide price movements (abbreviated as MWPM).
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temporary persistent temporary persistent
(equally-weighted) (equally-weighted) (principal-weighted) (principal-weighted)
buys
mean 0.4 16.3 7.2 12.4
st.dev. mean 7.2 7.8 10.5 12.1
st.dev 317.6 341.2 461.3 532.8
median −0.6 23.6 0.0 0.4
quantile 0.5% −925.4 −1039.9 −2024.0 −2028.2
quantile 5% −446.8 −434.5 −383.0 −398.3
quantile 95% 418.8 475.7 418.5 509.6
quantile 99.5% 855.1 1206.6 2345.1 2463.6
sells
mean −7.8 10.6 −15.5 −11.3
st.dev. mean 8.7 9.3 9.7 11.7
st.dev 364.6 388.9 403.9 489.5
median −1.4 −4.9 0.0 −0.1
quantile 0.5% −1377.3 −1284.7 −1837.2 −2464.1
quantile 5% −502.3 −490.3 −487.8 −553.6
quantile 95% 453.6 601.4 360.4 477.8
quantile 99.5% 1216.5 1343.2 1703.9 1912.2
Table VI: Temporary and persistent price effects of buys and sells (in bp), corrected for market-wide price movements
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variable coeff. st.dev. PCC
const 27.9 9.0
Momentumperc −82.7 32.3 −0.12
Momentumperc*log(Volatility) 26.9 9.3 0.15
log(Tradesizertdv) 3.1 1.2 0.05
Agencysingledum 36.6 6.6 0.13
Growthdum 14.6 5.3 0.06
Quantdum −21.9 7.0 −0.08
Usadum −52.1 7.5 0.00
Consdiscrdum 17.2 6.3 0.06
Energydum 44.9 12.9 0.08
Telecomdum 37.8 13.5 0.06
Utilitiesdum 23.0 10.1 0.05
R2 0.12
adj. R2 0.11
Akaike 12.29
Table VII: Estimation results for buys (conditional expectation)
The standard errors are obtained using White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity
consistent covariance matrix. The column captioned ‘PCC’ reports partial
correlation coefficients.
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variable coeff. st.dev. PCC
const −51.7 48.7
Eurdum −119.5 16.0 −0.19
Japdum −98.6 14.3 −0.19
Quantdum 137.9 14.1 0.28
Momentumperc*log(Volatility) −4.4 1.1 −0.21
log(Volatility) 26.6 8.9 0.10
log(Tradesizertso) −10.0 4.6 −0.06
log(Tradesizertdv) 10.4 4.8 0.06
log(Marketcap) −9.9 3.1 −0.09
Consumerdiscrdum −37.2 9.2 −0.09
Consumerstdum 26.0 16.6 0.04
Energydum −38.9 14.4 −0.05
Findum −36.2 9.4 −0.08
Healthdum −21.4 11.1 −0.04
Ictdum −19.3 13.9 −0.04
Materdum −32.6 12.1 −0.06
Quantdum*Usadum −61.7 17.4 −0.10
R2 0.19
adj. R2 0.19
Akaike 12.58
Table VIII: Estimation results for sells (conditional expectation)
The standard errors are obtained using White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity
consistent covariance matrix. The column captioned ‘PCC’ reports partial
correlation coefficients.
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variable coeff. st.dev PCC
const 8.77 0.62
log(Volatility) 0.38 0.10 0.08
log(Tradesizertso) 0.31 0.06 0.12
log(Tradesizertdv) −0.24 0.06 −0.09
Agencysingledum 0.83 0.21 0.09
Usadum −1.22 0.14 −0.18
Eurdum −1.71 0.24 −0.17
Ictdum 0.49 0.17 0.07
R2 0.22
adj. R2 0.21
Akaike 4.42
Table IX: Estimation results for buys (conditional variance)
The standard errors are obtained using White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity
consistent covariance matrix. The column captioned ‘PCC’ reports partial
correlation coefficients.
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variable coeff. st.dev. PCC
const 8.04 0.85
Usadum 1.54 0.36 0.11
Eurdum 0.95 0.44 0.05
Japdum 1.41 0.35 0.10
Growthdum 0.35 0.13 0.07
Quantdum −1.12 0.15 −0.17
Agencysingledum 1.16 0.19 0.12
log(Volatility) 0.38 0.12 0.08
log(Tradesizertso) 0.31 0.07 0.10
log(Tradesizertdv) −0.28 0.07 −0.10
log(Marketcap) −0.15 0.05 −0.07
Energydum 0.56 0.24 0.04
Materdum 0.35 0.24 0.04
Telecomdum 0.91 0.24 0.07
R2 0.20
adj. R2 0.19
Akaike 4.49
Table X: Estimation results for sells (conditional variance)
The standard errors are obtained using White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity
consistent covariance matrix. The column captioned ‘PCC’ reports partial
correlation coefficients.
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expected volatility
momentum×volatility country dummy United States
buys dummy for agency/single/principal trades country dummy Europe
momentum trade size relative to shares outstanding
dummy for quantitative/fundamental funds dummy for quantitative/fundamental funds
sells momentum×volatility dummy for agency/single principal trades
country dummy Europe country dummy United States
Table XI: The most important determinants of expected market impact and
market impact volatility.
The partial correlation coefficients in Tables VII, VIII, IX, and X have
been used to establish the most important determinants of expected
market impact and market impact volatility.
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Figure 1: The average temporary, persistent, and total price effects for of
buys (in bp)
This plot shows the average temporary, persistent, and total price effects of
buys in bp (corrected for market-wide price movements). According to this
figure, the temporary price effect (the return from the post-trade moment
to the trade) is positive, as it is measured as the decline in the price after
the trade. The price drops after a buy, since the liquidity effect on the
price dies out. The permanent price effect (the return from the pre-trade
moment to the post-trade moment) is also positive: the price at the
post-trade moment is higher than at trade initiation, due to the
information content of the buy. As a consequence, the total price effect −
obtained as the sum of the temporary and persistent price effects − is
positive as well.
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Figure 2: The average temporary, persistent, and total price effects of sells
(in bp)
This plot shows the average temporary, persistent, and total price effect for
sells in bp (corrected for market-wide price movements). According to this
figure, the temporary price effect (the return from the post-trade moment
to the trade) is negative, as it is measured as the increase in the price after
the trade. Usually, the price increases after a sell, since the liquidity effect
on the price dies out. The permanent price effect (the return from the
pre-trade moment to the post-trade moment) is also negative: the price at
the post-trade moment is lower than at trade initiation, due to the
information content of the sell. As a consequence, the total price effect −
obtained as the sum of the temporary and persistent price effects − is
negative as well.
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